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INTRODUCTION
Although the Constitution forbids punishing people simply on 
account of their poverty, the judicial systems in the United States 
nevertheless do so in a variety of ways, both direct and indirect. It is 
important to recognize as a starting point that, as former Chief Justice 
of Arizona Scott Bales noted: “Any day in the United States about 2.2 
million people are incarcerated. Another 4.4 million people are under 
some kind of penal supervision, probation, parole, and community 
supervision.”1 A critical subset of this population is in jail or under 
supervision because they cannot pay required amounts. Thus, “fines, 
fees, and bail not only can contribute to cycles of poverty, they can 
contribute to cycles of criminalization.”2 Chief Justice Bales was 
speaking at a panel in September 2019, at a remarkable conference 
convened at Duke Law School by the Duke Law Journal, the Bolch 
Institute for Judicial Studies, and the Duke Center for Science and 
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1. Conference Explores New Research on Court Fines and Fees, BOLCH JUD. INST. (Sept. 
17, 2019), https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/2019/09/conference-explores-new-research-on-court-
fees-and-fines [https://perma.cc/M3XR-65WJ]. 
2. Id.
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Justice that brought together judges and academics to make progress 
on issues of fees, fines, and bail.3 
Imposing mandatory fines and fees on the indigent, regardless of 
their ability to pay, or denying pretrial release to individuals who 
cannot pay secured bail has become a subject of mounting judicial, 
legislative, and public concern. Court debt can take the form of fines 
and fees—legal financial obligations (“LFOs”)—as well as the use of 
cash bail to determine who is detained pretrial and who is not.4 Millions 
of individuals each year are detained pretrial based on rigid secured 
bail schedules. In response to budget shortfalls, municipalities and 
states have turned to such fees as a revenue source, and as a result, 
court debt has vastly increased over the past three decades.5 
Researchers estimate that these court-imposed financial obligations 
amount to over $50 billion in the United States.6 These fines can 
multiply over time, resulting in mounting debt7 that in turn can cause 
individuals to lose their employment, housing, public assistance, 
driver’s licenses, and voting rights. The abuses of fines and fees in cities 
such as Ferguson, Missouri—where court fines and fees were 
Ferguson’s second-largest source of income8—have drawn attention to 
these formerly ignored and highly localized fee practices. 
3. See id.
 4. See  ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT 
FOR THE POOR 1–3 (2016); Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice 
Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2, 25, 29 (2010) 
5. See, e.g., Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ 
Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 509–10 (2016). 
6. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CHARGING INMATES 
PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 1 (May 21, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Charging_Inmates_Mass_Incarceration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5V5-AUVA]; see also Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and 
Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 516 
(2011) (“It thus appears that tens of millions of U.S. residents have been assessed financial 
penalties by the courts and other criminal justice agencies.”).
 7. ALEXES HARRIS ET AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14
(Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Monetary-
Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD67-KU5W].  
8. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEP’T 9 (Mar. 4, 2015) (“Ferguson generates a significant and increasing amount of revenue from 
the enforcement of code provisions.”); see also Consent Decree at 83–84, United States v. City of 
Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/ 
833701/download [https://perma.cc/8SDG-BPRX]; Mildred W. Robinson, Fines: The Folly of 
Conflating the Power To Fine with the Power To Tax, 62 VILL. L. REV. 925, 935 n.49 (2017); Neil 
L. Sobol, Lessons Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt, 
15 U.MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 293, 295–303 (2015). 
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Today, constitutional litigation,9 new policies and rulemaking by 
state supreme courts and bar associations,10 and legislation11 have 
increasingly addressed the problem of fines, fees, and bail as they affect 
civil and criminal litigants. A range of jurisdictions have recently 
overhauled bail and pretrial practices, created new systems to waive 
fees, and abolished the practice of suspending driver’s licenses for 
unpaid traffic fees. Drawing on work being done at the intersection of 
law and policy, in the courts, and in the academy, this conference 
sought to bring together judges and academics to create a much-
needed dialogue on this set of topics. The contributions to this 
symposium are interdisciplinary, studying the problem of court debt 
from a variety of perspectives. Sociologically informed work 
investigates the ways in which court debt burdens the poor and 
increases inequality. Constitutional analyses examine legal avenues 
increasingly used in nationwide litigation challenging fines-and-fees 
practices, including under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses. Empirical scholarship explores patterns in imposition of court 
fines and fees and the use of risk assessment as an alternative to bail in 
9. For bail-related litigation, see, for example, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Tex., 892 F.3d 147, 
166–67 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling regarding due process and bail determinations), aff’g, rev’g, and 
modifying in part, 882 F.3d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 2018). For driver’s license suspension related 
litigation, see, for example, Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653 (W.D. Va. 2019); Rodriguez 
v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 779–80 (M.D. Tenn. 2016); Thomas v. 
Haslam, 303 F. Supp. 3d 585 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), rev’d as moot sub nom, Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. 
App’x. 910 (6th Cir. 2019); and Landmark Lawsuit Settled, Paves Way for Fair Treatment of Low-
Income California Drivers, ACLU N. CAL. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.aclunc.org/news/ 
landmark-lawsuit-settled-paves-way-fair-treatment-low-income-california-drivers [https://perma.cc 
/BNF4-KEGN]. For litigation regarding fee-based diversion programs, see, for example, Mueller 
v. State, 837 N.E.2d 198, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“A practice of requiring payment of a fee as 
an absolute condition of participation in a pretrial diversion program discriminates against 
indigent persons in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) and Moody v. State, 716 So. 2d 
562, 565 (Miss. 1998) (en banc). For rulings denying relief in such challenges, see generally, for 
example, Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing 
ODonnell, and finding district court abused discretion in order of preliminary injunction in favor 
of arrestee, regarding pretrial decision-making); Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 
2019) (dismissing due process claim on the pleadings and rejecting application for preliminary 
injunction); Edwards v. Cofield, 2018 WL 4101511, No. 3:17-cv-321-WKW (M.D. Ala. 2018) 
(denying both plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment in challenge to pretrial bail practices); and Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 
1150 (D. Or. 2018) (denying relief on claims challenging driver’s license suspension). 
 10. See, e.g., A.B.A., TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND FEES 5 (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2018-AM-Resolutions/114.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TM37-X4BG].  
 11. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(1)(a)–(6)(b) (2019) (“A person’s license or 
driving privilege may not be suspended due to nonpayment of fines, costs, or restitution.”); 4 VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1109 (2019) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.289 (2019) (same). 
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pretrial decision-making. Administrative scholarship surveys the 
problem from the perspective of judicial procedures used to ensure 
both access to justice and mechanisms to secure sound funding for 
judicial functions. 
I. FINES, FEES, BAIL, AND COURT ADMINISTRATION
During the conference, Bolch Judicial Institute Director David F. 
Levi moderated the first set of discussions by those who are closest to 
the problems “on the ground”: judges and court administrators. To 
begin, the participants heard from Chief Justice Stuart Rabner of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rabner convened a task 
force in 2014 that made far-reaching recommendations to overhaul the 
use of bail in the state, and following enactment of legislation in 2014, 
each court in New Jersey abandoned the use of cash bail.12 Today, the 
courts screen defendants through the Public Safety Assessment 
(“PSA”) to assist them in identifying those who pose minimal risk to 
the community as they await a criminal trial, versus those who pose a 
greater risk of failure to appear or committing a new offense. The 
Administrative Office for the Courts provides a decision-making 
framework for judges using these new methods,13 and the data so far 
suggest that there has been greatly reduced reliance on pretrial 
detention, without adverse consequences.14 We then heard from Chief 
Justice Judith Nakamura of the New Mexico Supreme Court. New 
Mexico voters in 2016 approved a constitutional amendment to 
overhaul bail for the state, and after that occurred, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court developed new rules to implement the legislation, 
which a federal court just upheld.15 
Mary McQueen from the National Center for State Courts 
(“NCSC”), described their work. This includes issuing detailed 
principles regarding court debt, for example, recommending that 
12. Hon. S. Rabner, Bail Reform in New Jersey, in TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 27–29 (2017). 
 13. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:162-25(c) (2019); PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: NEW 
JERSEY RISK FACTOR DEFINITIONS (Dec. 2018), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/ 
criminal/psariskfactor.pdf [https://perma.cc/L34G-48L9]. 
 14. Editorial Board, Bail-Reform Law Continues To Show Its Effectiveness, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.northjersey.com/story/opinion/editorials/ 
2019/04/03/editorial-nj-bail-reform-law-continues-show-its-effectiveness/3345843002 
[https://perma.cc/MR6D-PKXS]. 
 15. Victoria Prieskop, Tenth Circuit Tosses New Mexico Bail Reform Challenge, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/tenth-circuit-
tosses-new-mexico-bail-reform-challenge [https://perma.cc/KT6Q-GHYD]. 
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“courts should acknowledge that their fines, fees, and bail practices 
may have a disparate impact on the poor and on racial and ethnic 
minorities and their communities.”16 We heard from Martin Hoshino, 
the Administrative Director of the California Judicial Council, which 
has tested a novel pilot program to use apps to better notify individuals 
of court appearances. Former Chief Justice Scott Bales offered his 
perspective, based in part on his experience convening the Arizona 
Task Force on Fair Justice for All. In 2016, the Task Force issued a 
report with sixty-five detailed recommendations to improve practices 
regarding fines, fees, and pretrial release, many of which resulted in 
substantial change as they were implemented.17 We heard from former 
Chief Justice Mark Martin, who in North Carolina convened both an 
Equal Access to Justice Task Commission, to examine ways to expand 
access to the civil justice system, and a North Carolina Commission on 
the Administration of Law and Justice, which among other things 
recommended bail reform.18 Finally, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor 
of the Ohio Supreme Court shared her experiences and perspective as 
cochair of the National Task Force on Fees, Fines, and Bail Practices, 
formed by the Conference of Chief Judges and the Conference of State 
Court Administrators.19 
II. EMPIRICALRESEARCH ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL
The second set of discussions was led by academics who have been 
conducting noteworthy research on the topics of fees, fines, and bail. 
Key contributions involved empirical analysis. Will Crozier presented 
an article, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License 
 16. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, PRINCIPLES ON FINES,
FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES 5 (Dec. 2019), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/ 
Fines%20and%20Fees/Principles-Fines-Fees [https://perma.cc/3C4P-9UG7]. 
 17. TASK FORCE ON FAIR JUSTICE FOR ALL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON FAIR JUSTICE FOR ALL: COURT-ORDERED FINES, PENALTIES, FEES, AND 
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES (Aug. 12, 2016). 
18. N.C. Comm’n on the Admin. of Law and Justice, North Carolina Criminal Investigation 
and Adjudication Committee Report, N.C. JUD. BRANCH, https://nccalj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/pdf/nccalj_criminal_investigation_and_adjudication_committee_report_pr 
etrial_justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DYS-ES4J]; Equal Access to Justice Commission Staff, 
NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.nccourts.gov/commissions/north-carolina-
equal-access-to-justice-commission/equal-access-to-justice-commission-staff 
[https://perma.cc/D42B-8976]. 
19. Nat’l Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail Practices, Resource Center, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Financial/Fines-Costs-and-Fees/Fines-and-Fees-
Resource-Guide.aspx [https://perma.cc/65N6-2VCD]. 
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Suspension in North Carolina, coauthored with Professor Brandon 
Garrett, that is published as part of this symposium issue.20 The piece 
examines data concerning driver’s license suspensions in North 
Carolina. They found that one in seven adult drivers in North Carolina, 
or 1.25 million people, have an indefinite suspension for failure to pay 
traffic tickets or failure to appear in court.21 Such a driver’s license 
suspension remains in place until the person “disposes of the charge.”22 
Importantly, the driver’s license is suspended before the person has an 
opportunity to present information concerning their ability to pay. The 
authors find, first, that black and Latinx individuals are 
overrepresented among persons with suspended licenses relative to the 
population, and second, that the population of whites below poverty, 
and blacks above poverty, are most strongly associated with more 
county-level suspensions. Finally, they explore the implications of their 
results for efforts to reconsider imposition of driver’s license 
suspensions for non-driving-related reasons. 
Professor Jessie Smith described results from novel pilot projects 
concerning bail and pretrial release in North Carolina. Those efforts 
have extended diversion from jail and pretrial representation to rural 
districts in the state. The results to date are extremely encouraging, and 
suggest that even in districts in which there are not public defenders or 
pretrial services offices, new approaches toward pretrial detention can 
be implemented. Daniel Bowes described his work, as part of the North 
Carolina Justice Center, to redress court debt, including through 
statewide restoration efforts, policy analysis, and advocacy efforts 
directed at new legislation.23 
III. RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINES, FEES,
AND BAIL
We also had an important discussion about the constitutional 
implications of fines, fees, and bail. The Framers of the Constitution 
were deeply preoccupied with the concern that the government could 
20. William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of 
Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585 (2020). 
 21. Id. at 6; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(1)–(2) (2019) (providing that a person 
charged with a motor vehicle offense must have her license revoked if she either fails to appear 
or fails to pay a fine after receiving a court order for either). 
 22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(1)–(2). 
 23. See Fair Chance Criminal Justice Project, NORTH CAROLINA JUST. CTR., 
https://www.ncjustice.org/projects/fair-chance-criminal-justice-project/overview/about/ [https://perma.cc
/BR6M-DP77] (describing the Fair Chance Criminal Justice Project’s mission and strategies). 
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impose abusive fines and fees upon persons. The Eighth Amendment, 
for example, states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”24 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses impose protections as against unfair, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory practices, including regarding punishments or 
deprivations conditional on ability to pay.25 In a unanimous ruling, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause 
as against the states.26 Professor Kellen Funk described his work 
examining the legal history of the relationship between the 
requirements of probable cause and indefinite detention for failure to 
make bail. 
Professor Sandra G. Mayson presented her essay, Detention By 
Any Other Name, published as part of this symposium issue, examining 
the procedural protections that the Constitution should be understood 
to require before a judge may impose unaffordable bail.27 Mayson 
argues that imposing unaffordable bail is no different than ordering a 
detention pretrial. If it is treated as a detention, then additional 
substantive and procedural protections apply. Mayson sets out what 
those safeguards would entail for the pretrial process in order to inform 
courts and legislative efforts to reform pretrial detention.
IV. RETHINKING COURT PRACTICES
Additional noteworthy work examined how to remedy automatic 
fines and fees that do not account for ability to pay. Professor Beth 
Colgan discussed her paper, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions 
and Structural Reform, also published as part of this symposium issue, 
examining the use of ability-to-pay tests.28 Colgan notes that more 
graduated approaches towards fines can be far more humane and just. 
Yet Colgan also critiques those tests under an abolitionist heuristic, 
asking whether such measures, intended as reforms, can in fact 
perpetuate the use of regressive fines and fees that should not be 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
25. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal 
Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM.&MARY L.REV. 397, 440–50 (arguing that both Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses, viewed cumulatively, should play a role in analysis of fines, fees, 
and bail).
26. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87, 689 (2019). 
27. Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643 (2020). 
28. Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69 
DUKE L.J. 1529 (2020). 
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imposed at all upon indigent persons. Colgan asks what it would take 
to eliminate any profit incentive from criminal justice, and instead 
redirect any such funds to the affected communities. Raising related 
concerns at the conference, Mitali Nagrecha described a recent report 
published by the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law 
School concerning the proportionality of fees and fines. While 
advocating for ability-to-pay inquiries, the report also raised concerns 
that such tests not be used in a punitive or subjective manner.29 
Nagrecha, Sharon Brett, and Colin Doyle have contributed an online 
piece to this symposium, Court Culture and Criminal Law Reform, 
describing the need to address practice and culture in the courts and 
not just policy change. They argue that “[t]o change court practices, 
reformers must understand court culture—that is, precisely how judges 
make their decisions, and what can be done to change judicial behavior 
and mindset.”30 Additionally, the authors call for further research on 
judicial culture related to issues such as fines, fees, and bail. 
We also considered the role of fines and fees in the wider context 
of the criminalization of poverty. Indeed, Professor Peter Edelman 
encouraged us to take a broader approach to the problem of fines and 
fees and view it in the context of other ways poverty is criminalized, 
such as chronic nuisance ordinances, the school-to-prison pipeline, and 
the criminalization of homelessness and mental health problems. He 
encouraged us to take a multiprong approach to solving these 
problems, focusing on both federal court litigation and policy and 
litigation strategies at the state level. 
Taking a law and sociology approach to the criminalization of 
poverty, Professor Monica Bell’s essay, Toward a Demosprudence of 
Poverty, coauthored with Stephanie Garlock and Alexander Nabavi-
Noori and also published as part of this symposium issue, describes a 
threefold process, substance, and structure of poverty punishment.31  In
addition to inadequate procedures, which others have highlighted, this 
 29. See  SHARON BRETT & MITALI NAGRECHA, HARVARD CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
PROGRAM, PROPORTIONATE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL 
REFORM 13–16 (2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Proportionate-Financial-
Sanctions_layout_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2M9-MCGC]; see also  HARVARD CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A GUIDE FOR POLICY 
REFORM (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Confronting-Crim-Justice-Debt-Guide-to-
Policy-Reform-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G8J-96XR]. 
30. Mitali Nagrecha, Sharon Brett & Colin Doyle, Court Culture and Criminal Law Reform, 
69 Duke L.J. Online (forthcoming 2020) (draft on file with Duke Law Journal). 
31. Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward a Demosprudence 
of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473 (2020). 
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essay focuses on “substance,” by which they mean legal oversight of 
the everyday lives of the poor through broad regulations and laws that 
can permit excessive legal control over them. By “structure,” the 
authors mean the ways that poverty channels marginalized people into 
systems of both civil and criminal punishment, even when the law itself 
appears class neutral. They propose a new conception of the 
criminalization of poverty, which encourages us to not only consider 
the largely process oriented concerns surrounding fines and fees, but 
also the long historical role the legal system has played as a mechanism 
of social control over marginalized groups. The authors suggest how 
judges and courts might take better account of these substantive and 
structural features of the criminal system. 
CONCLUSION
As the conference and this symposium issue demonstrate, fines, 
fees, and bail practices have deep social impacts. People languish in 
prison simply because they cannot afford cash bail. People continue to 
have criminal records and are subjected to mounting charges for parole 
because they cannot pay court costs or victim restitution. People lose 
the ability to legally drive and face arrest for driving with a revoked 
license because they cannot pay traffic fees. People borrow heavily, 
indebting family and friends, to satisfy court debts. 
Considered as a whole, the contributions to this conference and 
symposium issue show, from a variety of perspectives, how fines and 
fees can perpetuate poverty and inequality. Fortunately, awareness of 
the scale and severity of these costs has grown. Substantial work to 
remedy abusive fines, fees, and bail practices is being done by court 
administrators, chief judges, litigators, and others. This symposium, 
connecting that work to empirical, historical, sociological, and 
constitutional research, brings interdisciplinary insight into a complex 
legal and social problem. 
Further, this symposium brings institutional and practical insight 
to the problem. By discussing with judges and court administrators how 
to collect better data, provide better guidelines and rules for courts, 
and conceptualize the problem, we hope that this conversation will 
help connect judges and academics on a topic of urgent public concern. 
New research agendas reaching court culture and court policies; 
empirical data concerning the roles fines, fees and bail plays; and a 
reconsideration of constitutional rights can all help to inform future 
judicial practice. We hope that the symposium discussion between 
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judges and academics and the articles published as part of this volume 
move these conversations forward in the years to come. 
